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An Unanswered Question in Kennedy v. Louisiana:
How Should the Supreme Court Determine the
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Espionage?

I. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forever changed
both the international and domestic landscapes of United States
security efforts. With the erosion of the national sense of security,
the American military adapted to meet the new challenges of
insurgent warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq. Likewise, the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security and the enactment of the
U.S.A. Patriot Act signaled a turning point in American domestic
security strategies-strategies that required not only closer
surveillance within the national borders, but also further scrutiny of
the actions of U.S. citizens.
These internal security efforts often exposed acts of espionage
and betrayal by U.S. citizens. In 2001, Brian Patrick Regan worked
for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency that
maintained reconnaissance satellites.' He used his security
clearance to search the NRO's classified computer network for
information about the military efforts of Iran, Iraq, China, and
Libya.2 Regan planned to sell data to these foreign governments, 3
but he was arrested at Dulles International
Airport near
4
Washington, D.C., on his way to Europe. The FBI found coded
information and the addresses of Chinese and Iraqi foreign
embassies in Regan's pockets and shoes.5 His computer contained
letters to the governments of Iraq and Libya, in which Regan
offered to sell national secrets about these States' missile systems
for $13 million. 6 Regan was charged with three counts of

Copyright 2010, by SARAH FRANCES CABLE.
1. United States v. Regan, 228 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (E.D. Va. 2002). Regan
served in the Air Force from 1980-2000 and retired as a Master Sergeant. Id.
2. Indictment
9-10, United States v. Regan, Crim. No. 01-405-A (E.D.
Va. Oct. 23, 2001).
3. Espionage Case of FormerSergeant in Hands of Jury, CNN, Feb. 11,
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/10/regan.trial [hereinafter Espionage
Case of FormerSergeant].
4. Indictment, supra note 2, 22.
5. Id.
24, 28.
6. Espionage Case of FormerSergeant, supra note 3; Life Sentence for Bid
to Sell Secrets to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/03/21/us/life-sentence-for-bid-to-sell-secrets-to-iraq.html
[hereinafter
Life Sentence for Bid to Sell Secrets].
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attempted espionage, 7 and the United States Attorney's Office
sought the death penalty. The damaging effect of Reqan's attempt
to transfer the secret information was disputed at trial, and the jury
sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of capital
punishment.' 0 If he had been given the death penalty, Regan would
have been the first person executed for espionage in the United
States since Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were put to death for
conspiring to transmit secrets to the former Soviet Union in 1953.11
Espionage, attempted espionage, and conspiracy to commit
espionage are punishable by death under 18 U.S.C. § 79412 and the
sentencing guidelines of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598, also known as
the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA).I3 The constitutionality of
this penalty under the Eighth Amendment, however, has never
been directly addressed.
Despite the lack of jurisprudence on the death penalty for
espionage, prosecutions for the crime are common. The
Department of Justice reports espionage convictions and plea
agreements, 14 and national intelligence agencies research and
record espionage trends and developments. Although national
security concerns can discourage prosecutors from pursuing the
death penalty, the "political determination to execute spies remains
7. United States v. Regan, 228 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (E.D. Va. 2002).
8. Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, United States v. Regan,
Crim. No. 01-405-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2002).
9. EspionageCase of FormerSergeant,supra note 3.
10. Life Sentence for Bid to Sell Secrets, supra note 6; Threats and
Responses: Espionage; Jury Rules Out Death Penalty for Failed Spy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/25/us/threats-andresponses-espionage-jury-rules-out-death-penalty-for-failed-spy.html
[hereinafter Jury Rules Out Death Penaltyfor FailedSpy].
11. Espionage Case of FormerSergeant, supra note 3. See generally United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 588-90 (2d Cir. 1952).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
13. Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598
(2006).
14. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Chinese National
Convicted of Economic Espionage to Benefit China Navy Research Center
(Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminalcybercrime/
mengPlea.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hanssen Pleads Guilty to
Espionage (July 6, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/200l/July/
305civ.htm; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, New Orleans Man Sentenced
to More Than 15 Years in Prison for Espionage Involving China (Aug. 8, 2008),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-nsd-701 .html.
15. See KATHERINE L. HERBIG, DEP'T OF DEF., CHANGES IN ESPIONAGE BY
AMERICANS: 1947-2007, at vii-xiii, 46-61 (2008); CI Centre, http://cicentre.
com (last visited Feb. 16, 2010); Espionage Research Institute, http://www.
espionbusiness.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
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strong."'16 In the aftermath of September 11, the prosecution of
spies will likely continue to be a national priority.
The jurisprudence interpreting the constitutionality of capital
punishment for non-homicide crimes against individuals may
determine the constitutionality of future espionage executions. In
June 2008, the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the death penalty for the rape of a child in
Kennedy v. Louisiana.7 The Court noted that the Eighth8
Amendment protection against "cruel and unusual punishment"'
is based on the principle of "proportionality" and should be
interpreted according to the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."19 The Court then applied
a two-pronged test to make this determination. Under the first
prong, the Court reviewed objective evidence of a national
consensus on the acceptability of capital punishment for child
rape. 2 1 Through the second prong, the Court applied its
independent judgment of the Eighth Amendment's "text, history,
meaning, and purpose," including the purposes of punishment and
the degree of culpability of the crime.
Following this two-pronged analysis, the Kennedy Court held
that "the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the
rape of a child., 23 Moreover, the Court explicitly limited this
holding to crimes against individuals, stating, "We do not address,
for example, crimes defining and punishing treason, espionage,
[and] terrorism ... which are offenses against the State."2 This
raises the question of which constitutional test should be applied to
the death penalty analysis for espionage and other crimes against
the State. If Regan had been given the death penalty, instead of life
imprisonment, for attempted espionage and appealed his sentence,

16. Ryan Norwood, Note, None Dare Call It Treason: The Constitutionality
of the Death Penaltyfor Peacetime Espionage, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 820, 82223 (2002) (arguing that the death penalty for peacetime espionage is a
disproportional punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
17. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
19. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)). See generally Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)
("[P]unishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.").
20. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650.
21. Id.at2650-51.
22. Id. at 2649-50.
23. Id. at 2664.
24. Id. at 2659.
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how would the Supreme Court have analyzed the constitutional
claim?
This Note explores this unanswered question in Kennedy to
determine whether the Court's two-pronged test can be applied to
the death penalty analysis for espionage. Although the Court in
Kennedy noted that treason and terrorism are also offenses against
the State,25 this Note considers only espionage prosecutions
because they are becoming more prevalent "in lieu of the
procedurally more demanding

charge of treason." 2 6 Part II

discusses the history of espionage, the lack of jurisprudence on the
constitutionality of espionage executions, and the jurisprudence
that developed the two-pronged test applied in Kennedy. Part III
examines the Kennedy opinion and the Supreme Court's
determination of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty for
child rape. Part IV describes the conceptual differences between
crimes against the State, such as espionage, and crimes against
individuals, such as child rape, that may restrict the application of
the Kennedy test to capital punishment jurisprudence for
espionage. Part V analyzes why--despite these seemingly
conceptual differences between crimes against the State and crimes
against individuals-the Kennedy test can, and should, be applied
to the death penalty analysis for espionage. Part VI concludes and
stresses the necessity for jurisprudential overlap between Kennedy
and espionage executions.
II. BACKGROUND:

ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION

A. Espionage:Ancient Roots, CurrentTrends, and UnclearFuture
Espionage is "the practice of using spies to collect information
about what another government or company is doing or plans to
do."27 The ancient Egyptian, Greek, and Roman civilizations used

25. Id.
26. George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence about Treason, Law, Loyalty, and
Treason: How Can the Law Regulate Loyalty Without ImperilingIt?, 82 N.C. L.
REv. 1611, 1623 (2004); see also Suzanne Kelly Babb, Note, FearandLoathing
in America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National Crisis and the
Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 (2003) (discusses the
limited application of treason prosecutions). See generally U.S. CONST. art. 3, §
3, cl. 1 ("Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No
person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses
to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open court.").
27.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (8th ed. 2004).
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espionage to maintain political control of their empires. 28 After the
collapse of the Roman Empire, treason and espionage laws of the
Middle Ages promoted allegiance to feudal lords.29 When
European nations formally developed during the Renaissance,
espionage was employed to combat internal and external threats to
the government or monarchy. 30 Espionage was later used to end
anti-colonial rebellions as these European nations expanded their
colonial empires. 31 In the Industrial Revolution, the use of
espionage shifted, and governments began to spy on internal
political and labor organizations. 32 Finally, improvements in
photography, transportation, and communication in the 1800s
ushered in the modem espionage era and
33 its emphasis on research
and analysis of intelligence information.
Current espionage statutes in the United States focus on the
need for internal national security and punish those who threaten it.
As 18 U.S.C. § 794 states, capital punishment or imprisonment
shall be imposed on one who:
With intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign
nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, . . . to any

foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or
naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or
unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative,
officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either
directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book,
signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative,
blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, awliance, or
information relating to the national defense ....
Attempts to transmit such information 35 and conspiracies to violate
the statute36 also are punishable by death or imprisonment. Various

28.

Adrienne Wilmoth Lerner, Espionage and Intelligence, Early Historical

Foundations, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY

(K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner eds., 2003), available at http://www.
encyclopedia.com/doc/fullarticle/1G2-3403300282.html.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
35. Id.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 794(c) (2006).
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other federal statutes further define the facets of espionage in the
United States.37
While prosecutors can also pursue the death penalty through a
conviction under the Treason Clause of the United States
Constitution, the scope of this crime is more limited.38 Treason is
the only crime defined in the Constitution, and its roots date back
to English law. 39 After the Revolution, the Framers of the
Constitution deliberately narrowed the scope of the Treason
Clause 40 in order to limit the legislature's ability to oppress the
citizens. 4 1 Treason is defined exclusively as levying war against
the United States or adhering to the enemy by giving aid and
comfort. 42 Evidentiary protections included in the Treason Clause
further limit its application. 43 Treason convictions require proof of
an overt act and the sworn testimony of two witnesses to that act,
or the convictions can be established upon confession in open
court. 44 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 adds the statutory requirement of
allegiance to the United States to be convicted of treason.45
Although treason and espionage are punishable by death,
espionage is easier for the government to prove. Espionage focuses
on the act of transferring information, and the list of prohibited
conduct in 18 U.S.C. § 794 is much broader than that for treason.46
Unlike treason, espionage does not require that information be
given to an enemv of the United States or proof of actual harm to
national security. Moreover, espionage convictions do not require
proof of an overt act by two witnesses, a confession in open court,
or allegiance to the United States.48
37. HERBIG, supra note 15, at Appendix B-3 (including 50 U.S.C. § 783
(2006), Communication of classified information by government employees; 18
U.S.C. § 792 (2006), Harboring or concealing persons; 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2006),
Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information; 18 U.S.C. § 951 (2006),
Agents of foreign governments; 18 U.S.C. § 1924 (2006), Unauthorized removal
and retention of classified documents or materials).
38. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 3, cl. 1.

39. James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionalityof
Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U.Pm. L. REV. 99, 104-05 (1983).
40. Babb, supra note 26, at 1725.
41. Benjamin A. Lewis, Note, An Old Means to a Different End: The War
on Terror, American Citizens, and the Treason Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.

1215, 1221 (2006).
42. Babb, supra note 26, at 1727.
43. Id.
at 1726.
44. Id.

45. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
47. Norwood, supra note 16, at 846-47.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
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The executions of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in 1953 illustrate
the government's preference to prosecute under the espionage
statute rather than the Treason Clause. 49 In Rosenberg v. United
States, the Rosenbergs were charged with conspiracy to commit
espionage for delivering secrets to the former Soviet Union with
the intent to benefit that State.50 The defendants argued that they
were entitled to the evidentiary protections of the Treason Clause
51
because their alleged crime was in the "nature of treason."
However, because the prosecutor charged the Rosenbergs with
espionage, rather than treason, their sentences were upheld on the
testimony of only one witness instead of the two required by the
Treason Clause.' Thus, a careful use of prosecutorial discretion
greatly lessened the government's evidentiary burden.
The Rosenberg case provides perspective on the current
inclination to prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 794. Nevertheless, while
that case is the only time the Supreme Court has reviewed the
death penalty for espionage, the Court only considered the use of
authority to grant a stay of execution, not the constitutionality of
the actual punishment. 5 Consequently, there is no direct Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the constitutionality of capital punishment
for espionage.
Lower court cases, though, have indirectly analyzed the death
penalty for espionage. In the 1980s, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals focused on the sentencing guidelines for the punishment
in United States v. Harper,54 and the Middle District of Florida
reviewed the statute of limitations for espionage prosecutions in
United States v. Helmich.55 Then, in 2002, Brian Patrick Regan
filed several motions to strike the government's Notice of Intent to
Seek the Death Penalty56 for his attempted espionage conviction,
49. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 1623.
50. 195 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1952).
51. Fletcher, supra note 26, at 1623.
52. Id.
53. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 288 (1953). See generally
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (review of an espionage conviction
based on a warrantless search); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948)
(espionage conviction appeal on the issue of a coerced guilty plea); Pierce v.
United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (defendant appealed the overt act
requirement for conspiracy to commit espionage); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919) (espionage conspiracy charge based on publication and
distribution of information).
54. 729 F.2d 1216, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. 521 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (M.D. Fla. 1981), affd, 704 F.2d 547 (11th
Cir. 1983).
56. Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death, United States v. Regan,
No. 01-405-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2002).
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but he did not directly attack the constitutionality of the proposed
punishment.5 7 Instead, his motions focused on the issues of
vagueness, prosecutorial discretion, and the aggravating factors
listed in the FDPA5
A survey of the jurisprudence directly addressing capital
punishment for espionage reveals an immense void. This lack of
jurisprudence raises the question of whether the Court should look
to the case law on the death penalty for crimes against individuals
for guidance.
B. Crimes Against Individuals: Origins andExtensions of the
Death Penalty Analysis
Unlike with espionage, there is ample jurisprudence regarding
the death penalty when the victim of the crime is an individual.
The Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test to determine
whether the death penalty for non-homicide crimes against
individuals meets the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
requirement. The Court has expanded the test to restrict capital
punishment for certain types of defendants, such as "mentally
retarded defendants ' 59 and juveniles.60 A better understanding of
this two-pronged test is necessary in order to consider its
applicability to the non-homicide crime of espionage.
In 1977, the Supreme Court first introduced the two-pronged
test for capital punishment analysis in the context of rape. In Coker
v. Georgia, the Court held the death penalty unconstitutional for
the rape of an adult woman. 61 Coker was serving a sentence for
several felonies when he escaped from jail, robbed the home of
62
Mr. and Mrs. Carver, raped Mrs. Carver, and kidnapped her.
Under Georgia's rape statute, the jury sentenced Coker to death by
electrocution.6 3 The question on appeal was whether the death
penalty was a proportional punishment for the rape of an "adult
woman." 64 The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence,
57. United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(aggravating factors challenge); United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 666,
668-70 (E.D. Va. 2002) (vagueness challenge); United States v. Regan, 221 F.
Supp. 2d 661, 661 (E.D. Va. 2002) (prosecutorial discretion challenge).
58. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 674; Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 668-70;
Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 661.
59. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
60. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005).
61. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
62. Id. at 587.
63. Id. at 591.
64. Id. at 592.
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holding that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment."65 The Court reached this conclusion by developing
and applying a two-pronged test.
Under the first prong, the Court looked for objective evidence
of a national consensus on the "acceptability of death as a penalty
for rape of an adult woman.' 66 The Court considered relevant state
laws and statistics on jury decisions about the death penalty for
rape. 67 Through the second prong, the Court applied its
independent judgment to determine the constitutionality of capital
punishment for rape under the Eighth Amendment. 68 The Court
concluded that rape is not comparable to murder "in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public69....

The

murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not."
In 1982, the Supreme Court applied the Coker test in the felony
murder context.7 0 In Enmund v. Florida,the Court concluded that
imposing a capital sentence on an accomplice to robbery and
71
murder was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
Although the defendant participated in the robbery by waiting in
the getaway car,72 he did not commit the murders during the course
of the felony, nor did he intend for the murders to occur.7 ' The
Court used the two-pronged Coker analysis and stated that the
accomplice could be held criminally
liable only for his "personal
74
responsibility and moral guilt."
Since 2001, the Supreme Court has extended the Coker test
beyond certain non-homicide crimes against individuals to prohibit
capital punishment for specific categories of defendants. In Atkins
v. Virginia, the Court held that subjecting "mentally retarded
criminals" to the death penalty is excessive punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.75 The Court noted that defendants with mental
65. Id.
66. Id. at 593.
67. Id. at 593-97.
68. Id. at 597.
69. Id. at 598.
70. Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
71. Id. at 801.
72. Id. at 786.
73. Id. at 801.
74. Id. See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding the
death penalty for a defendant who actively and recklessly participated in the
events of a felony murder). "[M]ajor participation in the felony committed,
combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the
Enmund culpability requirements." Id. at 158.
75. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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disabilities are less capable of premeditating and planning criminal
activities; therefore, executing them does not effectively serve the
punishment goals of retribution and deterrence.7 6 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court stated that the death penalty is unconstitutional
for offenders younger than eighteen at the time of the offense.7 7
Because juveniles have "diminished culpability," the Court found
that "the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to
them with lesser force than to adults." 78 In both Atkins and Roper,
the Court applied the two-pronged test introduced in Coker and
subsequently followed in Kennedy in 2008.
III. KENNEDY V.LOuISIANA: A RETURN TO, AND AN EXPANSION OF,
THE COKER HOLDING

In Kennedy, the Supreme Court both returned to, and expanded
upon, its decision in Coker. The Court applied the two-pronged
Coker test to determine the constitutionality of the death penalty
for the rape of a child. 79 As the most recent extension of the death
penalty analysis for non-homicide crimes against individuals, the
Kennedy decision shines considerable light on the state of capital
punishment jurisprudence for non-homicide crimes and may help
predict the future of death penalty jurisprudence for espionage.
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
On March 2, 1998, Patrick Kennedy called 911 and reported
that two neighborhood boys had raped his step-daughter. ° He
claimed that his daughter was in the garage when the two boys
dragged her into the yard, raged her in the grass, and then rode off
on a blue ten-speed bicycle. The police found the girl in her bed,
wrapped in a bloody blanket.82 Kennedy explained that he had
carried his daughter into the house, cleaned her in the bathroom,
and then placed her in the bed while he called the police. 83 A
pediatrics expert described the victim's injuries as:

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.at 319-20.
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Id.at 571.
128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.at 2646.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The most severe he had seen from a sexual assault in his
four years of practice. A laceration to the left wall of the
vagina had separated her cervix from the back of her
vagina, causing her rectum to protrude into the vaginal
structure. Her entire perineum
was tom from the posterior
84
fourchette to the anus.
The victim required emergency surgery to repair the damage.85
A police investigation revealed evidence that contradicted
Kennedy's version of the events.8 6 This, coupled with the victim's
statement that Kennedy had raped her, led to Kennedy's arrest. 87
88
He was charged with the aggravated rape of his step-daughter,
and, upon
conviction, the jury unanimously sentenced him
89
90 to
death.8 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and
Kennedy appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 9 The
question before the Court was whether the Constitution
92 barred the
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child.
B. The Majority Opinion: Applying the Two-ProngedCoker Test
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, and Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the opinion.9 3 The majority
decision reversed the Louisiana Supreme Court, holding that "a
death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who
did not intend to assist another in killing the child, 94
is
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Relying on Coker, the majority noted that the two-pronged test for
determining the constitutionality of capital punishment under the
Eighth Amendment involves (1) objective evidence of a national
consensus regarding the death penalty for the crime at issue and (2)
the Court's independent judgment of the meaning and
95 purpose of
the Eighth Amendment's principle of proportionality.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at 2647.
Id.

88. Id.at 2645-46 (the statute specified that aggravated rape included rape
of a child under the age of twelve; Kennedy's step-daughter was eight years old
at the time of the offense).
89. Id.at 2648.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
at 2649.
Id.
at 2646.
Id.
at 2645.
Id. at 2650-51.
Id.
at 2650.
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1. The FirstProng: Objective Evidence of a National
Consensus
Under the first prong, the majority considered the history of
death penalty statutes for child rape and did not find a national
consensus supporting capital punishment for the crime. 96 Justice
Kennedy noted that many state statutes imposing the death penalty
for rape were invalidated by a 1972 Supreme Court decision; six
states reenacted death penalty statutes for rape after the decision,
but all were subsequently overruled. 97 The Court further found that
Louisiana had reintroduced the death penalty for child rape in
1995, and although five states followed suit, forty-four other states
chose not to make child rape a capital offense. 9" Justice Kennedy
then stated that the FDPA expanded the realm of non-homicide
crimes subject to capital punishment in 1994, but it failed to
include child rape. 99 In sum, the majority observed that thirtyseven jurisdictions (thirty-six states and the federal government)
allowed the death penalty for at least one crime--only six of them,
however, defined child rape as a capital offense.' 00
During the original hearing, the Court failed to consider a
capital child rape statute under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) when researching evidence of a national
consensus.' 01 A petition for rehearing was filed, and the Court
reviewed this oversight. 10 2 The majority determined, though, that
the UCMJ does not bear on the evidence of a national consensus in
the civilian context.' ° 3 Justice Kennedy stated that objective
evidence of a national consensus on the death penalty for a civilian
04
crime is not affected by the status of similar military offenses.1
After exploring the existence of state statutes imposing capital
punishment for child rape, Justice Kennedy compared this
objective evidence to that of Atkins and Roper. ' In Atkins, the
Court found that thirty states (including twelve non-capital states)
prohibited the death penalty for defendants with mental
disabilities, and twenty states permitted it. 106 In Roper, the majority
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2656-57.
Id. at 2651; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
Id. at 2652.
Id. at 2653.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, modifying Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653.
Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002)).
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noted that thirty states did not subject juveniles to capital
punishment, and eighteen of those states allowed the death penalty7
for other crimes; twenty states permitted juvenile executions.1
Finally, Justice Kennedy found that, in both cases, the states
that
0 8
allowed the death penalty rarely imposed the punishment.1
The majority rejected the dissent's argument that Coker was
misinterpreted by the states as banning capital punishment for
child rape, thus preventing a subsequent national consensus from
emerging in favor of the death penalty for the crime.' 0 9 Justice
Kennedy did not find reliable evidence to support the assertion that
Coker acted as a deterrent to the development of a national
consensus on capital punishment for child rape."10 The majority
observed that state courts limited the holding in Coker to the rape
of an adult woman and did not hinder capital child rape
legislation."' While noting that changes in state legislation were
persuasive, the Court did not find a "direction of change" in favor
of child rape statutes.' 12 Justice Kennedy argued that the six states
that had added capital punishment statutes for child rape since
1995 showed less of a "direction
of change" than the enacted
1 3
statutes in Atkins and Roper. 1
Finally, Justice Kennedy observed that no one had been
executed for child rape since 1964; moreover, no one had been
executed for any other non-homicide crime since 1963.114 He
further noted that, since 1964, Louisiana was the only state to
impose the death penalty for the rape of a child." 5 Concluding the
107. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005)).
108. Id. ("Only five [s]tates had executed an offender known to have an IQ
below 70 between 1989 and 2002 ... ; and only three [s]tates had executed a
juvenile offender between 1995 and 2005 ...
109. Id. at 2654.
110. Id. at 2655-56.
111. Id. at2655.
112. Id. at 2656.
113. Id. at 2656-57. In Atkins, eighteen states had enacted legislation
prohibiting capital punishment for defendants with mental disabilities from
1989-2001. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002)). In
Roper, only five states had outlawed executions of juvenile defendants from
1989-2001, but this was accompanied by a previous recognition of the
"impropriety" of executing juveniles before Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989), was decided. Id. at 2657 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 56567 (2005)). Stanford was a case allowing capital punishment for juveniles, and
Roper overruled it. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-66, 578-79. At the time of Stanford
in 1989, twelve states prohibited executions of juveniles under eighteen, and
fifteen states prohibited executions of juveniles under seventeen. Kennedy, 128
S. Ct. at 2657 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 566-67).
114. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657.
115. Id
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first prong, the majority found that a national
consensus existed
16
against the death penalty for child rape.'
2. The Second Prong: The Court'sIndependent Judgment
Under the second prong, the majority applied its independent
judgment to interpret the meaning and purpose of the Eighth
Amendment.' 17 While recognizing the extent of injury suffered by
victims of child rape, Justice Kennedy stated that this injury alone
did not mean that the execution of the defendant was a
proportional penalty."18 The Court found that the "evolving
standards of decency" in American society require both
consistency in assigning punishment and flexibility to tailor the
penalty to the specific defendant and crime at issue.'1 9 Because of
this tension in defining appropriate punishments, Justice Kennedy
noted that the instances in which capital punishment may be
imposed should be limited and should not be allowed when the
victim's life is not taken.' 20 The Court observed that the large
number of reported child rapes is consistent with this need to
restrain the use of the death penalty; furthermore, simply
narrowing the list of aggravating factors required to impose the
punishment will not enable the average juror to apply the death
penalty proportionally to the crime.121 Justice Kennedy stated that
allowing executions for child rape in this context could
22 lead to
unconstitutional experimentation and over-punishment.1
Justice Kennedy also noted that capital punishment for child
23
rape does not satisfy the penological goal of retribution.
According to the majority, retribution is achieved when the death
penalty allows the "community as a whole ...

to affirm its own

judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the
ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed.' ' 124 The Court stated
that, in non-homicide cases the death sentence must balance the
harm done to the victim. 1 5 In child rape cases, however, the
majority did not find evidence that the death penalty lessens the

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.at 2658.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 2658-59.
Id. at 2660.
Id. at2660-61.
Id.at 2661-62.
Id. at 2662.
Id.(citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)).

125. Id.
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victim's pain because the child
will be required to testify in
26
prolonged court proceedings.1
Finally, the majority observed systemic concerns in
prosecuting defendants for child rape. 27 Justice Kennedy noted
that the testimony of the child-victim is often "unreliable, induced,
and even imagined ... ,128 This creates a risk of wrongful
conviction because the child is usually the only witness to the
crime. 129 The majority also found that death penalty proceedings
require detailed testimony about the brutality of the rape and the
resultin injuries, information that is hard for children to
provide.
In addition, the Court stated that imposing the death
penalty for child rape could lead to increased non-reporting of the
crime; families may seek to protect their relatives, and defendants
could be encouraged to kill their victims to avoid discovery and
prosecution. 1 3 1 After applying Coker's two-pronged test to capital
punishment for child rape, the majority concluded
that execution is
32
not a proportional punishment to the crime.
C. The Dissenting Opinion: A Different Outcome Under the Coker
Analysis
Justice Alito wrote the dissenting opinion in Kennedy, with
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas joining the
opinion. 33 The dissenters opposed the majority's categorical rule
prohibiting the death penalty for child rape.134 Unlike the majority,
they believed that a child rapist could inflict
an injury, like that of
35
execution.
of
worthy
victim,
Kennedy's
First, Justice Alito attacked the majority's evidence of a
national consensus against the death penalty for child rape. 136 He
argued that the evidence was unreliable because Coker discouraged
state legislators from supporting subsequent death penalty
legislation and prevented any potential for an affirmative national
consensus on the issue.' 37 Moreover, Justice Alito stated that the
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 2662-63.
Id. at 2663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at2663-64.
Id. at 2664.
Id.at 2665.
Id.
Id.at 2676-77.
Id.at 2665-66.
Id.

1010

1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70

majority's reliance on Atkins and Roper was misplaced because
neither of those cases was preceded by a Supreme Court decision
limiting legislative consensus efforts. 13"8
Instead, the dissenters found a national consensus supporting
capital punishment for child rape.' 39 Justice Alito noted that five
states had enacted death penalty statutes for child rape since Coker4 °
and changes in societal attitudes accompanied this legislation.1
The dissenters concluded that state statutes establishing the Sex
Offender Registration Program, the involuntary commitment of sex
offenders, and residency restrictions for sex offenders all indicated
a national consensus favoring executions for child rape. 141
Justice Alito also criticized the majority's emphasis on policy
and procedural arguments that he characterized as irrelevant to the
Eighth Amendment analysis. 142 He argued that the Eighth
Amendment is not the appropriate mechanism for solving child
testimony problems or for protecting victims' interests." The
majority's remaining arguments, stated the dissenters, did not
justify its holding.'
Justice Alito disageed with the idea that
murder is "unique in its moral depravity;"T45 that murder involves a
distinct harm does not mean that the harm of child rape is
insufficient to warrant the death penalty. 146 Rather, Justice Alito
found that the injuries caused by child rape are irreparable for the
victim and negatively affect society. 147 In conclusion, the dissent
rejected the majority's arguments and supported the
constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape.14
D. The Two-ProngedTest After Kennedy: Extent of Influence
Remains Unanswered
Kennedy further developed the two-pronged jurisprudential test
149
of Coker by expanding the application of the test to child rape,
excluding military laws from the national consensus determination

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 2669.
Id.
Id. at 2669-70.
Id. at 2670-71.
Id. at 2673.
Id. at 2673-75.
Id.at 2675.
Id. at 2676.
Id. at 2676-77.
Id.
Id. at 2677-78.
Id. at 2646.
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under the first prong, 150 and addressing systemic concerns as part
of the Court's independent judgment under the second prong.'15
Currently, the two-pronged test is used to analyze the death penalty
for several non-homicide crimes against individuals and for
specific categories of less culpable defendants. As Kennedy states,
however, the Court has yet to address the application of this twopronged test to determine the constitutionality of capital
punishment for espionage and other crimes against the State.'
IV. CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CRIMES AGAINST
INDIVIDUALS AND CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE: OVERCOMING THE

HURDLE

Statutes that define crimes against the State and crimes against
individuals reveal seemingly conceptual distinctions that could
require different tests to determine the constitutionality of capital
punishment for each. These differences would prevent the twopronged Kennedy test from applying to espionage executions.
Although these distinctions exist, they should not prevent overlap
of the Eighth Amendment analysis.
First, the statutory origins of each category of crime are unique.
Crimes against individuals largely developed through state law
because the Constitution reserves to the states those powers not
expressly delegated to the federal government. 153 Crimes against
the State are mainly based on federal law due to the express power
of Congress to declare war and provide for the common defense
and general welfare. 154 However, although the Treason Clause in
Article III of the Constitution allows Congress to set the
appropriate penalty,' 55 the crime of treason actually originated in
state law prior to the Revolution and the drafting of the
Constitution. 156
Second, a crime against an individual has a tangible victim, as
indicated by the statutes defining these crimes. The relevant statute
in Kennedy refers to the aggravated rape of a child (under thirteen
years of age) and uses the term "victim" throughout the statute.' 57
On the other hand, a crime against the State, such as treason or
150.

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2008), modifying Kennedy, 128

S. Ct. 2641.

151.
152.

Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2663.
Id.at 2659.

153.
154.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 11.

155.
156.
157.

U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 3, cl. 3-42.
Wilson, supra note 39, at 107.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2007).
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espionage, has an intangible victim. Title 18, Section 794 of the
United States Code indicates that the person transmitting
confidential information must intend or have reason to believe that it
will be used "to the injury of the United States ....58 Despite this
159
difference, crimes against individuals have communal effects,
and crimes against the State can directly harm individuals
even
0
though the security of the State is the main target.16
Finally, the causal connection between each category of crime
and its primary victim can be dissimilar. Crimes against
individuals usually have a direct link between the criminal act and
the injury to the victim. The direct consequence of murder is the
death of the victim, and the immediate result of rape is physical
and emotional injury to the victim.161 This causation between act
and injury is less direct for espionage and other crimes against the
State. Espionage focuses on the act of transmitting information
with the intent to injure the United States or help a foreign
government, and the statute does not specify that this injury must
actually occur. 162 If there is a delayed injury to the United States, it
can be difficult to causally connect that injury to the perpetrator's
act of espionage. 163 Such a bright line between direct and indirect
effects, though, is misleading. If an act of espionage involves
transmitting the names of spies, then that crime can have an
immediate impact on those individuals.164 Likewise, crimes against
individuals have lasting consequences; a rape victim can

158. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
159. See David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 611 (1999); John E. Conklin, Dimensions of Community Response to the
Crime Problem, 18 Soc. PROBS. 373 (1971); Antoinette Errante, Closer to
Home: Comparative Perspectives on Childhood and Community Violence, 105
AM. J. OF EDUC. 355 (1997).
160. Aldrich Ames, a notorious CIA mole, spied for the former Soviet Union
from 1985 until 1994. During that time he revealed the identities of several FBI
and CIA agents, and the KGB (the State's secret police force) executed ten of
those agents. Thus, Ames' transmission of secret information created individual
victims. FBI, FBI History Famous Cases: Aldrich Ames, http://www.fbi.gov/
libref/historic/famcases/ames/ames.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
FBI History]; Soviet Union Inside the KGB, TIME, May 13, 1999,
http://www.time.com/time/ magazine/article/0,9171,956965,00.html; Victims of
Aldrich Ames, TIME, May 22, 1995, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,982988,00.html [hereinafter Victims ofAldrich Ames].
161. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (2007).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
163. See John Deutch, Moving Beyond Ames, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1995, at C7.
164. The execution of ten FBI and CIA agents was a direct effect of Aldrich
Ames' actions despite the later compromise of U.S. security. FBI History, supra
note 160; Victims ofAldrich Ames, supra note 160.
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experience
165the delayed effects of pregnancy or sexually transmitted
diseases.
These conceptual differences between crimes against
individuals and crimes against the State are not absolute and
should not prevent overlap of the Eighth Amendment analysis.
Crimes against the State are largely federal, but they share their
origins in state law with crimes against individuals. Moreover, the
distinction between tangible and intangible victims is not
complete; crimes against individuals affect the community, and
crimes against the State can impact individuals. Lastly, the direct
and indirect effects of the crimes are fluid. Both crimes against
individuals and crimes against the State have immediate and
delayed consequences. This overlap of conceptual characteristics
supports the incorporation of the two-pronged Kennedy test to the
death penalty analysis for espionage.
V. APPLYING THE KENNEDY TEST TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR
ESPIONAGE

A. Why the Kennedy Test Should Apply to EspionageExecutions
The two-pronged analysis applied in Kennedy to declare the
death penalty a disproportional punishment for child rape can, and
should, be used to determine the constitutionality of capital
punishment for espionage. The death penalty jurisprudence for
espionage is virtually nonexistent. Meanwhile, the current Kennedy
test has a rich jurisprudential history with a broad application to
non-homicide crimes against individuals and specific categories of
less culpable defendants. 6 6 Also, the conceptual differences
between crimes against the State and crimes against individuals are
not absolute and do not prevent overlap of the Eighth Amendment
analysis for child rape and espionage.
In fact, two lower court decisions analyzing the death penalty
for espionage have referenced contemporaneous capital
punishment cases for crimes against individuals. In the
Rosenbergs' initial appeal of their capital sentences in 1952, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld their death sentences by
referencing Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty for

165. See RAINN: Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, http://www.
rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-assault-victims (last visited Feb. 16,
2010) (citing effects of rape).
166. See supra Part II.B.
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crimes against individuals. 167 Although it limited its holding to the
specific factual situation, the Second Circuit considered "cruel and
unusual punishment"' 168 to exist when the punishment "shocks the
conscience and sense of justice of the people of the United
States' 1 69 -a standard developed in the context of crimes against
individuals. In the 1984 Harper decision, the Ninth Circuit found
18 U.S.C. § 794 to be unconstitutional because it lacked legislative
guidelines for imposing the death penalty. 170 The parties in that
case supported reliance on a contemporary capital punishment
standard for crimes against individuals to determine the
constitutionality
of the espionage statute's death penalty
171
provision.
Even though neither of these cases is a Supreme Court
decision, and neither directly addresses the constitutionality of
capital punishment for espionage, both rely on contemporaneous
Supreme Court decisions interpreting aspects of the death penalty
for crimes against individuals. Like these prior cases, capital
punishment sentences for espionage should reference the current
jurisprudence for crimes against individuals. The Kennedy decision
is the contemporary, relevant test of death penalty constitutionality
for non-homicide crimes against individuals, and it should be used
to analyze the constitutionality of capital sentences for the nonhomicide crime of espionage.
Opponents of expanding the two-pronged Kennedy analysis to
espionage executions could contend that the absence of a formal
test for espionage does not mean that the Kennedy test must be
adopted. This may be because the nature of the harm caused by
espionage to national security is unique; it can lead to a change in
foreign policy or the deaths of innocent people. While this harm is
distinct, it would only change the analysis under the two-pronged
test, not whether the test should apply. This concern also ignores
the already broad application of the Kennedy test, the conceptual
similarities between crimes against the State and crimes against
individuals, and the previous overlap between the death penalty
analyses of the two categories of crimes.

167. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 n.34 (2d Cir. 1952)
(citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 473 (1947) and
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892)).
168. Id. at 608.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra
Part II.A.
171. Id. at 1218 (referring to the Court's reasoning in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
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Critics of incorporation from one category of crime to another
might also argue that statutes are presumed constitutional until
they are challenged. Because Supreme Court cases on the
constitutionality of the death penalty provision for espionage are
scarce, 18 U.S.C. § 794 should be presumed constitutional, so no
test is needed. This argument overlooks the fact that many wouldbe challenges to the death penalty provision for espionage might be
preempted by plea agreements. Both prosecutors and defendants
may eagerly avoid trial in espionage cases: defendants want to
escape the death penalty, and prosecutors feel pressure to maintain
the confidentiality of government documents. Thus, the lack of
jurisprudence on the death penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. § 794 is
not a valid indication of its presumed constitutionality.
B. How the Kennedy Test Would Be Applied to EspionageExecutions
Deciding that the two-pronged Kennedy test should be applied
to the death penalty for espionage does not end the analysis. The
specific aspects of each prong must be considered to determine
how they would be evaluated in the context of espionage. With
slight modifications, the Kennedy test can be applied practically to
the Eighth Amendment constitutionality review for espionage
executions.
1. Applying the FirstProng: Objective Evidence of a National
Consensus
The Kennedy majority found a national consensus against the
imposition of the death penalty for child rape by comparing state
statutes defining the crime and its capital penalty. 172 Since
espionage is largely a federal crime, the Court's comparison of
state statutes does not directly correspond to the national consensus
analysis for espionage. Congress' enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 794
and the FDPA17 3 could be evidence of a national consensus
because state-elected officials in the House of Representatives and
the Senate participated in the process. By extension, then, a new
national consensus would exist every time Congress enacts new
legislation; such a volatile view of national consensus is contrary
to the Kennedy Court's evaluation of the history of child rape

172. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651-52 (2008).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) of

1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2006).
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legislation 7and
its emphasis on the steady development of a clear
4
consensus.
Another complication occurs when searching for a consensus
among state espiona e statutes. New Mexico is the only state to
enact such a statute, l' 5 but the statute is part of the state's military
code and should not be considered in the national consensus
analysis. The amended opinion in Kennedy disregarded the UCMJ
capital punishment statute for child rape when determining the
existence of a national consensus.' 76 Likewise, military statutes on
espionage (both federal and state) would not be applicable to a
consensus determination for the civilian crime of espionage under
18 U.S.C. § 794.
The federal nature of espionage statutes and the lack of
corresponding state espionage statutes require that the objective
prong of the Kennedy test be modified slightly for espionage. To
find a national consensus for espionage, the Supreme Court could
look beyond espionage statutes to state statutes defining other
crimes against the State, such as treason and terrorism. This would
balance the extreme of finding a national consensus in every
federal statute against finding no consensus because of the lack of
useful state espionage statutes.
Currently, nine states have treason statutes: Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, and Washington.' In the past decade, state legislators
have expanded the scope of their death penalty statutes,' 78 but
capital statutes for espionage have been excluded from this trend.
The events of September 11, however influenced ten states to pass
death penalty statutes for terrorism. 79 As noted by the Kennedy
majority, terrorism is a crime against the State, 180 and the states'
enactment of capital punishment for terrorism could indicate their
support for related espionage prosecutions.' l 8 On the other hand,
174. See supra Part III.B.1.
175. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-12-42 (West 2003).
176. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008), modifying Kennedy, 128 S.
Ct. 2641 (2008); see supra Part III.B.1.
177. Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
178. Jeffrey Kirchmeier, Casting a Wider Net: Another Decade of Legislative
Expansion of the Death Penalty in the United States, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 11
(2006).
179. Id. at 27-28 (Arizona, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Texas, and Virginia).
180. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659.
181. This Note recognizes, but does not address, the debate over the proper
definition of terrorism. See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal
Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249
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the states had an opportunity to include death penalty legislation
for espionage after September 11, and they chose not to. This may
be because terrorism often results in homicide, which is governed
by state law, while espionage remains largely a federal crime
beyond state jurisdiction. If this is the case, then state terrorism
statutes could indicate a growing trend toward promoting national
security within state law to accompany similar federal efforts.
National politics and objectives are often influenced by
international trends. Because espionage is a federal crime, the
search for a national consensus could include observations of
espionage statutes in other nations.1 82 The Court in Atkins and
Roper indirectly referenced international opinions when
1 83
prohibiting the death penalty for less culpable defendants.
Moreover, in Trop v. Dulles the Supreme Court directly applied a
comparative law approach by reviewing the nationality laws of
eighty-four countries to determine the constitutionality of the
federal Nationality Act of the United States.1 84 Such a comparative
analysis would be appropriate for espionage because of its federal
law origins and the crime's effects on international relations.
Regardless of the ultimate interpretation of the state and federal
statutes, the search for a national consensus from Kennedy is
applicable and useful to determine the constitutionality of the death
penalty for espionage.
The Kennedy majority also considered the extent of the
practice of executing defendants for the crime of child rape. 185 In
Kennedy, no defendant had been executed for child rape since
1964;18" the last execution for espionage was the Rosenbergs in

(2004); Alex Schmid, Terrorism-The DefinitionalProblem, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 375 (2004); Nathan Stewart, Ohio's Statutory and Common Law History
with "Terrorism ": A Study in Domestic TerrorismLaw, 32 J. LEGIS. 93 (2005).
182. This Note recognizes the ongoing debate over using a comparative law
analysis to interpret the United States Constitution. See Shawn E. Fields, Note,
Constitutional Comparativism and the Eighth Amendment: How a Flawed
ProportionalityRequirement Can Benefit from ForeignLaw, 86 B.U. L. REV. 963
(2006); Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Selection of Foreign PersuasiveAuthority, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 357 (2005); Yitzchok
Segal, The Death Penaltyand the Debate Over the U.S. Supreme Court's Citationof
Foreign andInternationalLaw, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1421 (2006).
183. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); see also Fields, supra note 182, at 980-81
(discussing the Supreme Court's references to "foreign law and international

opinion" in Roper and Atkins).
184. 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958).
185. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657.
186. Id.
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1953.187 Furthermore, no one has been put to death for treason
since John Brown in 1859.188 This rare use of the death penalty to
punish crimes against the State "could be interpreted as society's
evolving distaste for the penalty, at least against political
criminals." 189 Unlike the dissent's argument in Kennedy that the
misinterpretation of Coker prevented a national consensus from
developing in favor of the death penalty for child rape, the
Rosenberg executions have supported any subsequent efforts to
seek capital punishment for espionage by indicating that the
punishment is constitutional. Despite this affirmation, the jury
refused to apply the death penalty after convicting Brian Patrick
Regan in 2002. 90 This analysis of the frequency of the practice of
executing convicted defendants is appropriate for both child rape
and espionage.
2. Applying the Second Prong: The Court'sIndependent
Judgment
Under the second prong of the Kennedy analysis, the Court
used its independent judgment to interpret the Eighth
Amendment's meaning and purpose. 19 1 This prong is more easily
applicable to the death penalty analysis for espionage because it
considers the general purposes of punishment and the intent of the
Eighth Amendment instead of searching for objective evidence that
is harder to compare from one crime to another.
As described in Kennedy, the death penalty should be enforced
in limited circumstances because of the tension between promoting
consistency in applying the penalty versus flexibility to tailor the
punishment to the specific defendant and crime at issue."9 Just as
Kennedy considered the number of reported child rapes and the
effect of existing aggravating factors on jury discretion, 193 these
same factors are applicable to the death penalty analysis for
espionage.

187. EspionageCase ofFormerSergeant, supra note 3. See generally United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 588-90, 609 (2d Cir. 1952) (affirning the
Rosenbergs' convictions) and Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 288-89
(1953) (vacating the stay of execution).
188. Wilson, supra note 39, at 156.
189. Id.
190. Life Sentence for Bid to Sell Secrets, supra note 6; Jury Rules Out Death
Penaltyfor FailedSpy, supranote 10.
191. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2658.
192. Id.at 2658-59.
193. Id,at 2660-61.

2010]

NOTE

1019

The number of reported instances of espionage would influence
the risk of inconsistency in applying the death penalty to the crime.
Also, as with child rape statutes, the aggravating factors required to
impose capital punishment for espionage can be studied to
determine their effect on jury discretion. The aggravating factors
for espionage are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3592, part of the FDPA,
and are limited to the following circumstances: whether the
defendant (1) has been convicted of a prior espionage or treason
offense; (2) knowingly created a "grave risk" to national security;
or (3) knowingly jeopardized the life of another person. 194
By prohibiting the death penalty for child rape, Kennedy sought
to lower the rate of experimentation in the imposition of death
sentences without the necessary limiting guidelines. 195 This
concern is directly applicable to the constitutionality review of
capital punishment for espionage because of the lack of
jurisprudence on the issue. Despite the jurisprudence on the death
penalty for non-homicide crimes against individuals, the Kennedy
Court stated that extending the death penalty to child rape would
lead to dangerous experimentation when compared with the
characteristics and effects of murder.196 Likewise, the elements and
effects of espionage can be compared to treason and terrorism to
determine whether capital punishment would be disproportionally
experimental.
When considering the goal of retribution, Kennedy reviewed
the proportionality of the death penalty according to the extent of
harm to the victim.197 The bright line drawn by the majority
between the injuries of murder and rape requires more nuances in
the context of espionage. With espionage, the extent of harm to the
victim is complicated by the intangible nature of the victim and the
indirect causation between act and effect. Nevertheless, the extent
of injury from espionage can be compared with injuries from
treason and terrorism to determine the retributive value of
espionage executions.
Finally, the systemic concerns in Kennedy, including
evidentiary issues, the potential for increased non-reporting, and
the incentive to kill witnesses in order to avoid detection, should be
considered for espionage. 198 The testimonial evidence in an
espionage case is more likely to be competent; however, the main
evidentiary issue to be considered with espionage is the classified
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b) (2006).
195. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661.

196. Id.
197. Id.at 2662.
198. Id. at 2663-64.
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nature of the transmitted information. There is a national security
interest in protecting this information, but in a death penalty case
this evidence would be disclosed. The balancing of these interests
is unique to espionage cases.
Applying the death penalty to espionage convictions could lead
to increased non-reporting of the crime. Co-workers of spies might
want to protect defendants from possible execution. The
relationship between co-workers is less intimate than that of family
members, though, so the risk of non-reporting may not be as much
of an issue for espionage as it is for child rape. Moreover, the
incentive to kill the victim to avoid detection is less relevant to
espionage than to child rape because the likely victim of espionage
is the national community and not an individual person. A spy may
kill a possible informant to avoid detection, but this connection is
less direct than that of rapist and rape victim. When killing a rape
victim, a rapist is likely killing the only witness, and certainly the
key witness, to the crime. If a spy kills a potential informant, many
other witnesses may remain, and he has only slightly diminished
his risk of avoiding eventual detection.
The Eighth Amendment analysis in Kennedy is easily applied
to capital punishment statutes for espionage. The considerations
remain the same, but the analytic factors change with the criminal
context. In Kennedy, the crime of child rape was compared to
murder, 199 and espionage can be compared to treason and terrorism
to determine the proportional Eighth Amendment punishment.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although no one has been executed for espionage since 1953,
the government's pursuit of the death penalty against Brian Patrick
Regan illustrates the issue's continuing relevance. Since the
terrorist attacks of September 11 and the increased efforts to ensure
national security through diplomatic and covert efforts, espionage
statutes may become more relevant in the future. There is,
however, no direct jurisprudence on the constitutionality of the
death penalty for espionage. This uncertainty could lead to
unconstitutional experimentation and over-punishment the next
time a defendant is sentenced to die for spying. Whether the death
penalty for espionage is ultimately deemed constitutional or not,
this conclusion should be made after a careful analysis of society's
attitude toward the crime and the purpose and intent of the Eighth
Amendment.
199. Id. at 2658-60.
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Kennedy's two-pronged test for the death penalty for child rape
can be successfully applied to the constitutional analysis of
espionage executions. The conceptual characteristics of crimes
against individuals and crimes against the State share similarities,
and previous espionage cases have already referenced
contemporaneous Eighth Amendment standards for crimes against
individuals. With the lack of jurisprudence on the death penalty for
espionage, the jurisprudence for crimes against individuals should
be used to determine the constitutionality of the punishment.
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